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As it exists today, the welfare system in the United States is doomed to
failure. Taxpayers, politicians, and even recipients are urging reform and
President Clinton has promised to "end welfare as we know it."' While federal
welfare reforms are still in the preliminary stages, a number of states have
taken the initiative and enacted various experimental reform programs. 2 These
programs generally focus on helping the poor and disabled become self-
supporting. However, inaccurate negative stereotypes of recipients as lazy,
undeserving freeloaders who abuse the system often transform positive
motivations for reform into punitive measures designed to reform the
individuals rather than the system. The zeal for reform and the political
popularity derived from effecting change cannot justify violating the individual
rights and freedoms of the welfare recipients.
One program which may cross the line between permissible state action
and unconstitutional intrusion is known as Family Cap. 3 This program deters
families who receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)4
benefits from having children while on welfare by denying them additional
benefits. Although it is frequently asserted that there is no constitutional right
to welfare, this argument is merely a smoke screen to mask serious violations.
The Family Cap program infringes upon the fundamental right of reproductive
* The author would like to thank Professor Barbara Snyder and Natalie Wright for
their insight and support and my parents for their inspiration and encouragement.
I What Works, NEwREPUBLIc, Jan. 3, 1994, at 7.
2 Georgia, Iowa, Illinois, Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming, and Wisconsin are a few of
the states which have enacted reform programs. Battle Looms over Welfare Refonm, PLAIN
DEALER (Clev.), Dec. 26, 1993, at 18-A; see also infra part 1I.
3 The program has a different name in each state in which it has been proposed or
been enacted, such as Child Exclusion in New Jersey and the Parental Responsibility Project
in Wisconsin. I have adopted the Family Cap title because it is not identified with any one
state and refers more generally to all programs of this type. See generally Lucy A.
Williams, The Ideology of Diviion: Behavior Modification Welfare Refor Proposals, 102
YALEL.I. 719 (1992).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1988).
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choice guaranteed in Roe v. Wade.5 This freedom of choice and privacy
includes both the decision to bear children as well as to terminate pregnancies. 6
Any government action restricting these rights must meet the highest standards
of justification. This Comment will examine these issues to determine the
constitutional validity of Family Cap. 7
Part II provides a brief background of Family Cap and its present status as
state law and as a tool for reform. Part I explores the argument that, although
there is no established constitutional right to welfare, the Supreme Court has
occasionally implemented the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to strike
down welfare restrictions imposed by the government which burden
fundamental rights. This part analyzes how Family Cap violates the rights to
procreation, to privacy, and to reproductive choice by placing a restrictive
condition on the pursuit of those rights. According to the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, these fundamental rights require a stricter standard of
judicial review than normally applied to public assistance cases. Part IV argues
that Family Cap could not survive such strict review because its validity is
undermined by its flawed premises, its practical incongruity with limited
abortion funding for low-income women, and the inescapable reality that the
children it excludes from financial assistance will eventually cost the state more
money in order to correct exacerbated health and educational problems.
Finally, this Comment concludes that the Family Cap program should be
abandoned before it is approved on a federal level where it is presently under
consideration.
II. THE FAMILY CAP PROGRAM
Family Cap has been enacted in at least four states: New Jersey,8
Wisconsin,9 Arkansas, 10 and Georgia." While the specific provisions of each
5 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (permitting unmarried people the right
to decide whether or not to have children); see infra part III.B.
7 There are also a number of alleged statutory violations involved which are presently
being considered in C.K. v. Shalala, No. 93-5354 (D.N.J. filed Dec. 1, 1993), which is
pending in the District Court of New Jersey. These violations will not be discussed in this
Comment.
8 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (West 1993).
9 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 49.25(4) (West Supp. 1994-1995).
10 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services recently granted Arkansas's
request to experiment with a Family Cap program in all but 10 of its counties. James
Jefferson, U.S. Lets Arkansas Stop E&tra Welfare Check for Added Otildren; Refonn Aims
to Cut Costs, Boost 'Responsibility', CoMm. APPEAL (Memphis), Apr. 6, 1994, at lB.
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state's program vary, the basic concept is consistent. If a woman bears a child
while her family12 is receiving benefits from AFDC, the family will not receive
any increase in governmental support. For example, a family of three will
receive only the benefits of a family of two; the new child will not be eligible
for any state assistance.13 Each state must receive a waiver from the federal
government, specifically the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), in order to alter the statutory requirements of the AFDC program. 14
The Clinton Administration has been granting these waivers in an effort to give
the states more flexibility in welfare reform. 15 New Jersey's program is the
11 GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-115 (1994). Numerous other states, such as California,
Arizona, Maryland, and Nebraska, are considering Family Cap proposals or are presently
seeking the necessary federal waiver. The program has been rejected by state legislatures in
Louisiana, Missouri, Maine, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Indiana. Kelly
Richmond, Reshaping the Welfare State, RECORD, June 19, 1994, at A25 (citing the
American Public Welfare Association as its source). For discussion of federal waiver, see
infra note 15 and accompanying text.12 Throughout this Comment, "family" generally refers to a single parent household
where the parent is the mother. While this is not always the case, it is the likely scenario.
13 The newborn child is still eligible for food stamps which are provided by the federal
government.
14 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1988) (waiver provision). AFDC is a federally funded
program which is administered by the states, however the states are not required to adopt it.
In fact, Wisconsin recently decided to withdraw from the federal welfare system and create
its own public relief program by 1999. Wat Works, supra note 1.
15 Under the Bush Administration, HHS granted New Jersey's and Wisconsin's
waivers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1315, the provision of the Social Security Act which
allows waiver of the requirements of AFDC, 42 U.S.C. § 602. Prior to filing suit on behalf
of affected welfare recipients, the Legal Services of New Jersey, the National Organization
for Women (NOW) Legal Defense Fund, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
of New Jersey asked the Clinton Administration to reverse New Jersey's waiver, but it
refused.
Many advocates of welfare reform argue that the federal government should step aside
and allow the states to control the administration of welfare benefits. Given his experiences
as a former governor, President Clinton has promised to give states more flexibility to
experiment with new programs and has used the federal waiver to fulfill this promise. Jason
DeParle, States' Eagerness to Experiment on Welfare Jars Administration, N.Y. TMEs,
Apr. 14, 1994, at Al. Opponents, however, argue that the waivers have been granted too
easily and that many of these experimental programs violate welfare recipients' rights. One
California program that was granted a waiver was subsequently declared unconstitutional.
See Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993), aiftd, 26 F.3d 95 (9th Cir.
1994) (enjoining a program which cut benefits to new residents as a violation of the right to
travel). Congress has also heard testimony concerning HHS's failure to consider the
experimental programs' impact on children and families before granting the waivers, an
issue pertinent to Family Cap. See Testimony of Melinda Bird, Western Center on Law and
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only Family Cap program which is fully operational and it has subsequently
been challenged in the District Court of New Jersey by various nonprofit legal
groups on behalf of the affected AFDC recipients. 16 Due to its operational
status and the pending suit, it serves as the model for this Comment.
A. Individual State Provisions
The New Jersey Family Cap program, also called Child Exclusion, was
enacted as one bill in a six-bill package collectively referred to as the Family
Development Act. 17 The other five bills in the package focus on helping
recipients become self-supporting through training programs, education, and
marriage incentives. The Family Cap statute provides for "eliminating the
increment in benefits under the AFDC program for which that family would
otherwise be eligible as a result of the birth of a child during the period in
which the family is eligible for AFDC benefits. . . -"1 The state determines a
standard of need for each welfare family according to the number of family
members, sources of income, and other factors. 19 Under the New Jersey
Family Cap program, the family's standard of need will not be incrementally
adjusted to accommodate the new child. As an incentive to encourage these
families to work and to become self-supporting, an "earned income
disregard" 20 is attached to the program. This provision allows a recipient
family to keep any income it earns by working without having its benefits
reduced. Normally, when calculating the standard of need, the state deducts
Policy, Before the Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government
Operations, Federal News Service, Sept. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNWS file.
16 C.K. v. Shalala, No. 93-5354 (D.N.J. filed Dec. 1, 1993), was filed by the Legal
Services of New Jersey, NOW Legal Defense Fund, and the ACLU of New Jersey. The
case is being brought in federal court because the plaintiffs are challenging HHS's decision
to grant New Jersey's waiver as well as claiming that New Jersey's Family Cap violates
various federal statutes and the Constitution. On April 28, 1994, the plaintiffs moved for a
preliminary injunction. Three motions for summary judgment, submitted by C.K., HIS,
and the New Jersey Department of Health, were argued before Judge Politan in 1995, but
no order has been issued yet. See David Glovin, Welfare Advocates File to Bar Reform,
RECORD, Apr. 29, 1994, at A03. Two conservative groups, the American Legislative
Exchange Council and the Empowerment Network Foundation, have moved to be included
as defendants in the suit. See Conservative Groups Challenge Family Caps, Abortion Rep.
(American Political Network), Mar. 4, 1994 (States section).
17 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-19 (West 1993).
18l d. § 44:10-3.5.
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A) (1988).2 0 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.6 (West 1993).
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any earned income from the benefits allotted to the recipient family. The
Family Cap incentive "disregards" the added income of any employed family
member when determining the family's standard of need; the earned income is
not deducted entirely from the benefits. 21 Thus, the family's newly calculated
standard of need should theoretically accommodate the addition of another
child.
The other states' Family Cap programs resemble New Jersey's with minor
yet noteworthy distinctions. The Wisconsin Parental Responsibility Project22 is
similar to the New Jersey plan except that it is aimed solely at teenage parents.
The provisions are otherwise generally the same, including the earned income
disregard. Arkansas's Family Cap provides recipients with access to Norplant
and other birth control counseling and education.23 The Georgia Family Cap
program, 24 does not have the earned income disregard incentive. However, it
exempts births which are the result of "a verifiable rape or incest."2 5
Furthermore, it is limited to recipients who have been receiving benefits for a
period of twenty-four months.26 Despite the practical ambiguity of what
constitutes a "verifiable" case of rape or incest, these two qualifying factors
make the Georgia program the least objectionable model of Family Cap. 27
21 Id.
2 2 WIS. STAT. ANN. §49.25(4) (West Supp. 1994-1995).
23 See Jefferson, supra note 10.
2 4 GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-115 (1994).
25 Id.
2 6 Id. The program became effective January 1, 1994.
2 7 Part IV explains that two of the flaws of the Family Cap program are that it
penalizes women for getting pregnant regardless of the reason (rape, incest, failure of
contraceptives) and that the program is based on inaccurate stereotypes of welfare mothers,
including that most recipients are permanently dependent. The Georgia statute appropriately
narrows its focus to exclude rape and incest victims and the clearly short-term, transitional
recipients. The constitutional issues raised by this Comment are still applicable to its
program, however.
A Maryland Family Cap proposal attempted to minimize the problems associated with
penalties and inaccurate stereotypes by linking the passage of the program to the end of the
ban on state funding for abortions. Charles Babington, Maryland Senate Links Welfare,
Abortion Fund Ouanges, WAsH. PosT, Mar. 25, 1994, at C3. This compromise, however,
led to legislative disagreement and the Family Cap provision was removed from the bill.
Governor Schaeffer vetoed the resulting bill and was pursuing the federal waiver for Family
Cap prior to losing the 1994 election. Robert Timberg, Bentley Would Toughen Welfare
Requirements, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 8, 1994, at IC. Following that election, the Maryland
House of Delegates added a modified Family Cap measure to its most recent welfare reform
bill. This measure provides vouchers to help pay for some infant necessities, such as diapers
and formula. The state's senate has refused to adopt any Family Cap measure. Marina
Sarris, Assembly Has Much Left to Do, BALTimoRE SUN, Apr. 2, 1995, at IC. Recently
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B. Statutory Shortcomings
The earned income disregard is a deceptive tool of welfare reform.
Employment is often difficult if not impossible for single welfare mothers.
Welfare mothers face a variety of obstacles which make it difficult for them to
make a successful transition from the home to the workplace: gender
discrimination, poverty, lack of skills, and often disabilities and minority
status.28 Although society now expects mothers to work while they are
pregnant or when they have newborns and infants at home, only one-fourth of
nonwelfare married mothers work full-time; the others either work part-time or
not at all.29 Furthermore, without adequate childcare facilities, work is
unrealistic for most single mothers. Thus, many AFDC recipients who would
be "eligible" for the earned income disregard have no real access to it.
Enacted in the name of reform, these statutes allow the government to
intrude into one of the most private decisions a woman makes during her life:
whether or not to have a child. The denial of funding deprives the family of
basic necessities such as diapers, food, clothes, and housing.30 The state is
trying to stop women from pursuing their right to have a child by denying them
necessary aid if they exercise it. In light of these constitutional and practical
problems, the New Jersey Family Cap bill was opposed by church groups, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the New Jersey Association for Children, and
elected Governor Parris N. Glendening has said he opposes Family Cap, but he has also
indicated that he would not veto a welfare reform bill that included it. Terry M. Neal,
Maryland Parents Behind on Child Support Could Lose Drivers Licenses, WASH. POST,
Mar. 30, 1995, at B03.
28 JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHEsKEL HASENFELD, TH MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF
POVERTY 167 (1991).
2 9 DAvID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMCAN FAMILY 132-33
(1988). One economist, Tared Bernstein of the Washington-based Economic Policy Institute,
points out the irony of these societal expectations: "'Conservatives talk about family values.
Sure, they want women to stay home and look after their children-unless of course they're
talking about women on welfare and, then, they're supposed to get out and get a job.'"
Linda Diebel, Bill CGinton 's War on America's Poor; U.S. Welfare Refonrs Are Having a
Cruel Impact on Women and Children. Will Our Poor Be Next?, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 6,
1994, at El.
3 0 Press Release from the Legal Services of New Jersey, NOW Legal Defense Fund,
and ACLU of New Jersey, Women and Children Receiving AFDC Sue Federal and State
Agencies to Overturn Exclusion of Newborn Children from AFDC Grant and Eliminate
State Efforts to Deter Conception and Birth of Children 1 (Dec. 1, 1993) (on file with NOW
Legal Defense Fund and the Ohio State Law Journal).
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the National Organization for Women.31 At the time, presidential candidate and
Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton declared he would not sign such a bill in his
state.32 Today, however, the Clinton Administration is considering Family Cap
as a possible federal reform.33
IT[. THE IMPOSITION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION
Ultimately, Family Cap's goal is to modify the behavior of welfare
mothers by punishing those families who, for whatever reason, 34 do not
comply with the government's desires and conditions. The denial of benefits
causes the loss of basic necessities which effectively coerces women into
waiving their fundamental right to bear a child.35 According to the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, the government is barred from indirectly violating
a right which the Constitution forbids it to violate directly. 36 In other words,
because the government cannot enact a law forbidding welfare mothers to have
children, it cannot use a condition on their benefits to achieve the same result.
It has been suggested that the central purpose of the doctrine is to determine
what level of judicial review should be applied to the government's action.37 If
31 Wayne King, Senate Sends Florio Welfare Bill That Linits Benefits for Mothers,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 1992, at Al.32 Wayne King, Florio Signs an Overhaul of Welfare, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1992, at
Bi.
33 "Clinton's reform package allows every state to implement a New Jersey-style
family cap without having to seek a federal waiver." Richmond, supra note 11; see also
Battle Looms over Welfare Refonn, supra note 2.
34 Although the program seeks to encourage "mutual responsibility" of welfare
mothers in order to promote family planning and to end the "thoughtless childmaking"
discussed in Part IV, Family Cap punishes mothers who involuntarily get pregnant as well.
With the exception of the Georgia statute, there are no exceptions for rape, incest, or failure
of contraceptive devices.
35 See infra part III.B for analysis of this fundamental right.
36 See generally Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Teory of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, The
Supreme Court, 1987 Tenn-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:
The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). Cf.
Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990).
37 "Unconstitutional conditions doctrine determines how much government justification
is to be demanded, not whether the demand has been met." Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1422
n.22.
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the condition affects a constitutional right, the doctrine requires that it be
subject to the highest level of review rather than merely the rational basis test
normally applied to government regulations. An examination of this claim
involves an explanation of the purpose and development of the doctrine, a
review of the rights in question, and an analysis of the application of the
doctrine to the Family Cap program.
A. Purpose and Development of the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine was originally developed during
the Lochner era38 as a judicial tool to protect individual economic liberties from
state intervention. 39 Through the doctrine, the Supreme Court used the
Constitution to limit the increasingly expansive government interference in the
free flow of interstate commerce. One of the earliest and clearest statements of
the doctrine is found in Frost & Frost Trucking Corp. v. Railroad
Commission,40 a 1926 case concerning restrictions attached to the use of state
highway systems:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation
which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for
a valuable privilege which the state threatens to otherwise withhold.... If the
state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its
favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that
guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may be thus
manipulated out of existence. 4 1
38 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Lochner era is characterized
by the Court's frequent overturning of state laws which interfered with economic liberties
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally JOHN E.
NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 356-69 (4th ed. 1991) (describing
the Lochner era).
3 9 David S. Coale, Norplant Bonuses and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 71
TEX. L. REv. 189, 198 (1992); see also Sunstein, supra note 36, at 596-97.
40 271 U.S. 583 (1926). In Frost, the Court invalidated California's attempt to
condition the right of a trucking company to use the public roads on its agreement to follow
certain limitations on charges to its customers.
41 Id. at 593-94.
[Vol. 56:637
FAMILY CAP
Despite the Court's abandonment of the protection of substantive economic
rights in the late 1930s,42 its distrust of coercive government intrusion into
private rights remained. The new focus became personal liberties. 43 With the
rise of the regulatory state following the demise of economic due process,
government intervention in both economic and personal areas has become the
norm rather than the exception. It has been argued that the doctrine, created
from the belief that government regulation is an artificial supplement to a
system governed by common law, cannot survive in a system where the
opposite is true.44 Thus, the doctrine's shift in focus has not been entirely
smooth; it lacks a clear test or method by which conditions can be evaluated.
However, the central concern about government intrusion which gave rise to
the doctrine persists, perhaps on a greater scale due to the unprecedented
regulatory powers of the government. Indeed, the Court continues to apply the
doctrine albeit inconsistently. 45
B. Doctrinal Reasoning
The doctrine serves as a response to two arguments which support
government conditions: (1) that the government's greater power to refuse to
provide a benefit includes the lesser power to provide it conditionally, 46 and
(2) that those who voluntarily participate in government programs have
"waived" their constitutional protections.47 The first argument has been widely
criticized and, in fact, was dismissed completely in Frost:
It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the
state, having the power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such
42 In 1937, contrary to its firmly antiregulation stance of the Lochner era, the Court
decided a variety of cases which upheld state and congressional commerce and spending
powers. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state
regulation setting a minimum wage for women workers); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding NLRB regulations on employee bargaining rights
against private employer). See generally PAUL BREsT & SANFORD LEvINSON, PROCESSES OF
CoNsTITUrIoNAL DEcisIONMAIING 341-89 (1992) (describing the decline of judicial
intervention in economic regulation).
43 See Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1505.
44 See generally Sunstein, supra note 36.
45 The Supreme Court's application of the doctrine has lead to highly inconsistent
results upholding some conditions while overturning others without a clear line of reasoning
distinguishing the cases. For further discussion of the various theories analyzing the Court's
treatment of these cases, see infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
46 See Baker, supra note 36, at 1190.
47 See Sunstein, supra note 36, at 593-94.
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conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is
not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions
which require the relinquishments of constitutional rights.4 8
Furthermore, critics have argued that the theory is logically flawed because it
assumes "that the conditional denial of a benefit is qualitatively identical to an
absolute denial." 49
The second argument, that those who voluntarily participate in government
programs waive their constitutional rights, warrants close examination. It
breaks down into two parts which the Court has frequently used as tests in its
analysis: 50 (1) whether certain rights are inalienable and therefore cannot be
waived, 51 and (2) whether the government's power to condition benefits
coerces people into waiving their rights. 52
1. Unwaivable Rights: The Right to Bear a Child
The first question goes to the heart of the Family Cap debate: are there
certain rights which cannot be waived? The Court has identified particular
rights which fall into this protected category-fundamental rights. 53 Thus, in
order to evaluate Family Cap under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, an
inquiry into the rights at stake is necessary. As mentioned earlier, Family Cap
infringes upon the right to bear a child as established by the rights to
48 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926).
49 Baker, supra note 36, at 1191. Although it is still occasionally implemented, see
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 368 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), the
"greater/lesser power" argument has also become somewhat outdated as the importance of
government entitlements has grown. The value of government benefits, whether in the form
of jobs or financial assistance, is now viewed as a right rather than merely a privilege. See
generally Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.. 733 (1964). The recipient
therefore deserves certain procedural safeguards before the entitlement is denied or
withdrawn. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). The Family Cap program
raises some questions of procedural due process as well because the women who get
pregnant have no opportunity to explain the reason why the pregnancy came about or to
describe their financial needs.
50 See infra notes 74 and 79.
51 Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1476-89; see Baker, supra note 36, at 1215.
52 See Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1428-56.
53 Fundamental rights are those which are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973)
(holding that education is not a fundamental right under the Constitution). For further
explanation, see infra note 103.
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procreation, privacy, and reproductive choice. Each of these rights is well-
established in the law.
The right to procreate was first recognized as a fundamental right in
Skinner v. Oklahoma5 4 where the Court declared it "a sensitive and important
area of human rights." 55 In Skinner, the Court upheld the right of a person who
was convicted two or more times for crimes "'amounting to felonies involving
moral turpitude'" 56 to have children. If convicted felons cannot be stripped of
this right, it is difficult to condone taking it away from law-abiding citizens
simply because they are poor.57
In 1965, the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut" held that the
fundamental right to privacy is embedded in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights. 59 The case involved married couples' right to use contraceptive
devices. 60 Thus, the right to privacy was linked to the concept of reproductive
choice at its inception. In an equal protection claim relying on the Griswold
decision, unmarried persons were also guaranteed this right to choose whether
or not to have children in Eisenstadt v. Baird.61 Justice Brennan wrote, "If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundanentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."62 The establishment of this right for unmarried women is highly
significant for many of the AFDC mothers. Although society still condemns
54 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
55 Id. at 536.
56 Id.
57 Although the case may be distinguishable from the infringement of the right to
procreate involved in Family Cap because Skinner would have been sterilized and therefore
permanently incapable of pursuing his right, the establishment of this fundamental right is
merely one brick in the wall of defenses protecting a woman's right to bear children.
58 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
59 Id. at 484. Justice Douglas's opinion in Griswold extracts the right to privacy from
the implied rights suggested in the Bill of Rights' individual amendments. "The association
of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights. The right to educate
a child in a school of parents' choice ... is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study
any particular subject or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been
construed to include certain of those rights." Id. at 482. Douglas concludes that "zones of
privacy" are created by the implicit guarantees of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments. "[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.... JIThe right of
privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one." Id. at 484-85.
60 Id. at 479.
61 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
62 Id. at 453 (second emphasis added).
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out-of-wedlock births, the law recognizes them as the exercise of a fundamental
right.
Finally, Roe v. Wade63 and its progeny have further secured a woman's
right to reproductive freedom. Although these cases are commonly known as
the Abortion Cases, it has been established and affirmed that the fundamental
right recognized in Roe includes the right to bear a child. 64 In upholding Roe,
the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey65 elaborated on the rights that case
recognized:
If indeed the woman's interest in deciding whether to bear or beget a child had
not been recognized as in Roe, the State might as readily restrict a woman's
right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further
asserted state interests in population control, or eugenics, for example. Yet,
Roe has been sensibly relied upon to counter any such suggestions. 66
Indeed, the Family Cap program appears to do just what the Casey Court
predicted may occur if the right to bear a child was not constitutionally
protected. The program can reasonably be viewed as an attempt to control the
population growth of a certain disfavored segment of society. 67 Casey confirms
that this action is impermissible. 6s
An analogous area of law which relies upon a woman's unconditional right
to bear a child involves probation conditions placed on convicted women. In
People v. Pointer,69 a woman convicted of child abuse was put on probation
for five years with the condition that if she conceived a child during that time
she would be put in prison. The state court, citing both Roe and Griswold,
struck down the condition saying, "There is, of course, no question that the
condition imposed in this case infringes the exercise of a fundamental right to
63 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64 See infra note 68.
65 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
66 Id. at 2811 (citations omitted).
67 See Alexander Cockbum, Welfare, Norplant and the Nazis; Sterilization Prograws;
Beat the Devil, NATIoN, July 18, 1994, at 79.
68 Cases affirming Roe and the rights it established are Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (upholding the essential holding of Roe while abandoning the
trimester framework it provided); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490
(1989); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
69 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128 (1984); see also People v. Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th 362
(1992); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
[Vol. 56:637
FAMILY CAP
privacy protected by both the federal and state constitutions." 70 The court also
asserts that such a condition may "be coercive of abortion" which "is in our
view improper." 71
A similar choice is faced by women who become pregnant under Family
Cap: either abort or face destitution. 72 Indeed, women probationers and AFDC
mothers bear similar relationships to the State; they are bound to it. In many
ways the State controls their access to their rights. It is inexplicable why, as in
Skinner,73 the criminals' right to bear children has been declared fundamental
and inalienable, yet this same right is suddenly waivable for the AFDC mothers
whose only crime is poverty.
Thus, the firmly established rights to procreation, privacy, and
reproductive choice demonstrate that the right to bear children is
constitutionally protected. The right is inalienable and cannot be waived. This
conclusion answers only one half of the inquiry, however. In order to violate
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the condition in question must infringe
upon the protected right.
2. Waiving Constitutional Rights: The Coercion Element
The Court has examined this question of infringement of rights by
considering whether the government's imposition of a condition coerces people
into waiving their protected rights. This analysis has been implemented in a
number of cases. When a condition forces a person to choose between a
fundamental right and a government benefit, the Court has often characterized
the condition as coercive and referred to it as a penalty. 74 In Sherbert v.
70 Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 1139. It should be noted that New Jersey's state
constitution also has a privacy provision which is invoked by the plaintiffs in C.K. v.
Shalala, No. 93-5354 (D.N.J. filed Dec. 1, 1993).
71 Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 1141. Some conservative opponents of Family Cap
also argue that it will encourage abortion.
72 Following decisions like Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977), however, abortions are not easily available to poor women. Lack of
Medicaid funds for abortions makes the Family Cap condition even more burdensome. For
a discussion of the state laws regarding abortion funding in the states where Family Cap has
been enacted, see infra part IV.B.
73 The probation condition cases differ from Skinner in the same way that the Family
Cap condition does; the ability to bear children is not permanently infringed for women
convicts like the men being sterilized in Skinner. Yet, the probation condition cases show
that even this temporary violation of a fundamental right is invalid.
7 4 See generally Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974)
(invalidating a durational residency requirement for medical care as violating right to
travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating denial of welfare benefits
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Verner,75 one of the most notable of these cases, the Court struck down a
denial of state unemployment benefits to a woman who could not work on
Saturdays for religious purposes as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. Using the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, Justice
Brennan described the condition as coercive:
The [denial] forces her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon
the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her
Saturday worship.7 6
If the Court recognizes the burden imposed by the condition as coercive or
deterrent of the ability to pursue a constitutional right, it will invalidate the
condition. Opponents of Family Cap characterize it as a penalty.77 The denial
of benefits forces a welfare mother to choose between having a child and
forfeiting the benefits, and not having a child (or being forced to terminate the
pregnancy) in order for her family to maintain a livable per capita income.78 As
in Sherbert, the choice imposes the same kind of burden as if the mother were
fined for having a child.
However, the Court has often found the coercive element lacking and
upheld conditions which it refers to as nonsubsidies rather than penalties. 79
to residents who had lived in state for less than a year as violating the right to travel);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (invalidating a denial of unemployment benefits to
a woman who could not work on Saturday for religious reasons as violating the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)
(invalidating a state requirement that World War II veterans take a loyalty oath as condition
of receiving a veterans' property tax exemption).
75 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
7 6 1d. at 404.
7 7 See generally Williams, supra note 3; Press Release, supra note 30.
78 To call the income "livable" is a generous description; often the benefits a welfare
family receives are below the calculated standard of need. However, it is still better to
receive some assistance than none at all. In other words, although the AFDC benefits are
barely enough to live on, the needy families are better off receiving a little rather than
nothing. Press Release, supra note 30, at 1-2.
79 Lyng v. United Auto., 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (upholding a denial of food stamps to
families which become needy because the breadwinner is on strike); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding denial of funding for abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977) (upholding denial of funding for abortions); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471




Under this characterization, the government is not interfering with the pursuit
of a right, it is merely refusing to subsidize the right.80 The abortion funding
cases, Maher v. Roe8 l and Harris v. McRae,82 incorporate this reasoning. In
Harris, the appellees argued that the denial of funding for abortions under the
Hyde Amendment83 penalized a woman's right to choose an abortion rather
than childbirth, which is funded. The Court, however, asserts that "the Hyde
Amendment... represents simply a refusal to subsidize certain protected
conduct. A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated
with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity." 84
Unfortunately, the Court's determinations of what is a penalty and what is
a nonsubsidy are discouragingly inconsistent. The viable distinction between
them is the amount of coercion the Court perceives in the government's action.
Yet, how the government's refusal to subsidize Mrs. Sherbert's exercise of her
religion by withholding unemployment benefits is more coercive than its refusal
to subsidize low-income women's reproductive choice is difficult to explain. 85
Due to this ambiguity, proponents of Family Cap can characterize it as a
nonsubsidy as easily as its opponents characterize it as a penalty. According to
their reasoning, the government is not actively preventing women from having
children, it is merely refusing to subsidize their choice to do so. In other
words, a woman may have a child while on welfare, but the government is not
required to help her. Yet, the same question remains: at what point does
withholding help become an affirmative action penalizing the woman? Thus,
relying on the penalty/nonsubsidy distinction to understand the doctrine does
little to clarify its application and effect.
Other theories, such as evaluating the directness of the relation between the
condition and the benefit, have been offered but are also unable to fully explain
the Court's methodology. 86 Under this theory, the less direct or "germane" 87
80 See Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1439.
81432 U.S. 464 (1977).
82 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
83 Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979). The
Hyde Amendment was passed by Congress as a federal restriction on the use of Medicaid
funds for abortion.
84 Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
85 The particular right being violated is not dispositive of the Court's decisions either.
The Court has often upheld and invalidated conditions burdening the same right in different
cases. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding condition which
burdens right to procreate) with Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44
(1975) (invalidating condition burdening the right to procreate). Thus, in the example in the
text, the distinction between the two cases is not that the pursuit of religious beliefs is
regarded more favorably by the Court than the pursuit of an abortion.
86 See Baker, supra note 36, at 1205; Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1452.
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the condition is to the benefit, the more willing the Court will be to invalidate
it. Neither the coercion nor the germaneness theory provides adequate
guidance for future practical applications of the doctrine. Another theory,
which specifically evaluates the Court's approach to public assistance cases
which invoke the doctrine, provides valuable insight into the Family Cap
scenario. It is known as the "price theory." 89
C. An Application of the Doctrine
1. The "Price Theory"
Developed by Professor Lynn Baker, the "price theory" involves a two-
prong test which, in Professor Baker's analysis, consistently predicted the
Court's decisions in twenty-three public assistance cases. 90 The first prong asks
87 See Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1457.
88 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that a condition requiring
states to raise their minimum drinking age sufficiently related to the federal interest in
highway safety to justify its attachment to highway funding); FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (invalidating a condition which denied federal public
broadcasting funds to stations that engage in editorializing); see also Sullivan, supra note
36, at 1464 ("Unrelatedness of condition to benefit thus characterizes a 'penalty.'").
89 See generally Baker, supra note 36.
90 These cases are: Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment See., 489 U.S. 829 (1989)
(invalidating restriction on free exercise of religion); Lyng v. United Auto., 485 U.S. 360
(1988) (sustaining a condition which denied food stamp eligibility to households whose
breadwinner was on strike); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (overturning restriction on free
exercise of religion); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (upholding limitation on food
stamp benefits available to each household); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (invalidating denial of unemployment benefits for
refusing to work for religious reasons); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding
denial of Medicaid funding for medically necessary abortions); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448
U.S. 358 (1980) (upholding denial of Medicaid funding for medically necessary abortions);
Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (upholding statute which denied Social Security
death benefits to mother of deceased's illegitimate child if she never married the deceased);
Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978) (sustaining durational residency condition on
receipt of Social Security benefits); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978); Califano v.
Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (upholding statute which disqualifies disabled claimant from
receiving benefits if he gets married); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding
denial of Medicaid funding for abortions which were not medically necessary in the first
trimester); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (upholding denial of public funding for
elective abortions); Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975)
(overturning regulation which declared pregnant women ineligible for unemployment
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whether the challenged condition involves a constitutionally protected right.91
If so, then the second prong looks specifically at the heart of public assistance
issues and asks whether the effect of the condition is to require persons unable
to earn a subsistence income, and otherwise eligible for the benefit (welfare
recipients), "to pay a higher price" to engage in that constitutionally protected
activity than similarly situated persons who earn a subsistence income.92
In the case of Family Cap, the first prong of the "price theory" is satisfied
by the constitutionally protected right to bear a child. Before applying the
second prong of Professor Baker's theory to this novel, undecided case, it
would be helpful to demonstrate its use with one of her own examples. 93 In the
abortion funding cases, Harris and Maher, the constitutional right at issue is
the right to terminate one's pregnancy. Poor women claimed that the denial of
Medicaid funding effectively kept them from exercising their rights. According
to Professor Baker's analysis, the denial of public funding forces poor women
to pay the market price for an abortion, the same price a subsistence income
earning family would pay. 94 There is no loss of statutory entitlement and no
extra cost is charged to poor women. 95 Poor women do not pay a higher price
to engage in the protected conduct. Therefore, the condition does not infringe
upon any constitutional right. This conclusion is consistent with the Court's
holdings in those cases. 96
Regarding Family Cap, Professor Baker's second prong raises a popular
argument frequently used by proponents of the program: working class families
do not get raises from their employers when they have additional children,
benefits for certain time surrounding birth); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974) (invalidating durational residency requirement for nonemergency medical care
as a restriction on interstate travel); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973) (invalidating restriction on freedom of association); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971) (overturning restriction on alien's interstate travel as violation of equal
protection); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding regulation which
conditioned AFDC benefits on recipient's permitting a search of its home); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding maximum amount of AFDC benefits available to
families of certain size); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating restriction
on right to interstate travel); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (invalidating
restriction on right to practice religion).
91 Baker, supra note 36, at 1217.
9 2 Id.
93 Professor Baker illustrates her theory in all twenty-three cases. This particular
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therefore welfare families do not deserve additional benefits. 97 This argument
is flawed, however, and the price theory illustrates its shortcomings.
2. Application and Analysis
In this case, does the government's denial of additional benefits require
AFDC families to pay a higher price to engage in the constitutionally protected
right to bear children than it requires of families who earn a subsistence
income? The answer is yes. The government does provide a benefit to
subsistence-income-earning families in the form of tax deductions for dependent
children and tax credits for childcare costs. 98 The money these families save
per child is far more than the additional benefits a welfare mother receives. 99
This analysis looks to the government's treatment of the families earning a
subsistence income, not the employer's, because it is the government's action
which is in question. Family Cap's proponents' argument about getting a raise
is comparing apples and oranges. Thus, according to one interpretation of
Professor Baker's theory of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Family
Cap program forces welfare mothers to pay a much higher price to pursue their
constitutional right to have a child.
The second prong of Professor Baker's theory indirectly incorporates a
form of equal protection analysis: wealth-based discrimination. In comparing
the effect of the condition on the rights of welfare families to the rights of
nonwelfare families, the theory seeks to ensure an equality of access to rights
between economic classes. 10° "[E]ach such condition separates those earning a
subsistence income but otherwise eligible for the benefit from otherwise eligible
persons unable to earn a subsistence income by providing only the latter an
incentive not to engage in a particular behavior."101 However, the Court has
97 King, supra note 31.
98 Anna Quindlen, The $64 Question, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1992, at A21.
99 For example, a single mother with two children in New Jersey receives tax
deductions and childcare credits from both the federal and state governments. If her yearly
income is $20,000, she will save $600 in federal deductions and $30 in state deductions. See
26 U.S.C.A. § 151(c) (West. Supp. 1995) (federal deductions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:3-
1(b)(2) (West Supp. 1994) (state deductions). She also will receive $1200 of federal credit
and $40 of state credit to offset her childcare costs for two dependents. See 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 21(a), (c) (West. Supp. 1995) (federal childcare credit); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 54:8A-15.1
(West 1986). The total amount she saves is $1870. By comparison, the average amount a
New Jersey welfare mother receives each month for an additional child is $64, or $778 a
year. See also Williams, supra note 3, at 736 n.107; Quindlen, supra note 98.
100 See Baker, supra note 36, at 1220.
101 Id. at 1208 n.79.
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repeatedly refused to make wealth-based classifications suspect.' 02 Professor
Baker's method, therefore, allows for a rational basis level of review to cases
involving fundamental rights which normally demand a strict scrutiny
review. 10 3 In this way, her theory accounts for the seemingly haphazard results
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public assistance cases. Yet,
lowering the level of review circumvents the issue. These cases involve more
than a mere question of the allocation of government resources; the rational
basis review, generally applied when evaluating typical state administrative and
regulatory actions, is inadequate when a constitutional right is targeted. If a
fundamental right is at stake, the Court should expect no less than a compelling
state interest and that the condition imposed be narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. 14
IV. CAN FAMILY CAP SURVIVE A STRICT STANDARD OF REvIEw?
It has been suggested that determining the appropriate level of judicial
review is the central purpose of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 0 5
Regardless of the analysis of penalties and nonsubsidies, the essential value of
the doctrine is that it serves to undercut a government attempt to infringe upon
102 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-28 (1973);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970). In other words, the Court does not
use strict scrutiny when reviewing wealth-based discrimination.
103 The Supreme Court has declared certain rights "fundamental." These rights
demand the strictest level of judicial review. The Court decides whether the state legislation
in question "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17. In
describing its application of this doctrine in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1971), the
Court states, "It is enough to say that the classification in Shapiro was subjected to strict
scrutiny under the compelling state interest test... because it impinged upon the
fundamental right of interstate movement." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375
(1971) (applying strict scrutiny based on an equal protection claim involving a suspect
classification, national origin).
104 The Supreme Court has stated: "[Tihe Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
guarantee of 'due process of law'. . . include[s] a substantive component, which forbids the
government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at al, no matter what process
is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest." Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993) (citations omitted). Also, "[S]trict
scrutiny... require[s] that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
state interest .... Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2063 (1992).
105 "Unconstitutional conditions doctrino determines how much government
justification is to be demanded, not whether the demand has been met." Sullivan, supra note
36, at 1422 n.22.
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a fundamental right with minimal justification for doing so.106 The doctrine
provides a rationale for using strict scrutiny in cases which do not directly call
for it because they do not directly violate a constitutional right. Public
assistance cases, for example, generally require only a rational relation between
the condition and the legitimate state interest. The doctrine allows the Court to
look beyond the smaller statutory right to public assistance and to address the
greater constitutional right being threatened. The inquiry is two-fold: does the
condition actually infringe upon the protected right and, if so, can the
government justify the infringement?
One purpose of the Family Cap program is to discourage AFDC recipients
from having additional children while enrolled on public assistance.' 0 7 Thus,
the condition it imposes upon women acts as an obstacle to their right to have
children; it is intended to burden that right. Preliminary statistics show that, in
New Jersey, from August to October 1993, there were 452 fewer babies born
to mothers on welfare than in those months the previous year.10 8 Although it is
unclear whether these figures indicate the effectiveness of Family Cap or
simply a drop in the birthrate attributable to other factors, the proponents of the
program claim credit for the change. 10 9 Therefore, the only issue remaining is
106 See Sunstein, supra note 36, at 603.
107 Proponents of the program refer to this purpose as encouraging recipients to make
responsible choices: "What this does is give welfare recipients a choice. They either can
have additional children and work to pay the added costs, or they can decide not to have
any more children. It's their call and a decision that puts them in the same position as
anyone else in mainstream America who must choose among options." King, supra note 31
(quoting New Jersey Assemblyman Wayne Bryant). Opponents of the program challenge
the idea that welfare recipients have the same options and choices that anyone else in
mainstream America has. They interpret the purpose of Family Cap as an "attempt to deter
and penalize women on AFDC from conceiving and having children" in order to "reduce
rates of fertility and childbirth among AFDC families." Press Release, supra note 30, at 2,
1 respectively.
108 Richard Lacayo, Unraveling the Safety Net, TIME, Jan. 10, 1994, at 25, 27.
109 The correlation between economic incentives (or disincentives) and behavior
modification is highly contested.
The reason for the lack of correlation seems apparent. Decisions about
childbearing, marriage, and living arrangements are very complex. They surely are not
unaffected by economic incentives, but they are affected by a host of other factors as
well. If those other factors-for example, the general societal perception of out-of-
wedlock births or of single parenting-are also shilling, they may dwarf the effects of
the economic incentives. And, even if they are not, there may be very few people for
whom small changes in economic well-being would make a difference sufficient for
them to change their sexual behavior or basic living arrangements.
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whether the government can justify its action. There are a variety of state
interests which may be served by the Family Cap program: welfare reform,
economic concerns, encouraging welfare recipients to be responsible family
planners. Whether any of these interests qualifies as compelling is arguable.
The real shortcoming of the program, however, lies in the substance of the
program itself. It is far from "narrowly tailored" to meet any compelling state
interest.
A. Family Cap's Flawed Premise
Designed to promote behavioral modification by removing any financial
incentive to bear children, Family Cap feeds off of the perception that welfare
recipients are dysfunctional and deviant members of society because they
cannot support themselves.' 10 The program purports to encourage "mutual
responsibility" between the recipients and the state by forcing welfare mothers
to make the same difficult decisions about having children which nonwelfare
families must make."' It perpetuates the idea that welfare mothers are
"thoughtless childmaking people" who constantly get pregnant in order to
collect more money from the government rather than work. By reducing the
rate of childbirth, proponents of the program claim that it will begin to solve
the problem of generational welfare dependency."l 2
The facts, however, defy the stereotypes. 113 Contrary to public perception,
AFDC families are typically the same size or smaller than nonwelfare two-
THEODORE R. IARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT
MYrHS, ENDURING REALrrms 220 (1990). If the program's use as an incentive is not
effective, it cannot justify the constitutional infringements it causes. Thus, if the 452 fewer
births are not attributable to the Family Cap disincentive, the welfare mothers and their
2398 children who were born during those months are being burdened by the program for
no reason. See generally Lacayo, supra note 108, at 27.
Furthermore, "even if the decline turns out to be a result of the cap, it will represent a
reduction of just one-fourth of 1 percent of the state's caseload." Richmond, supra note 11
(paraphrasing the comments of Michael Laracy, Director of Policy and Planning at New
Jersey's Human Services Department, who studied the Family Cap for the Center on Law
and Social Policy while on a leave of absence).
I1 0 See Williams, supra note 3 passim.
111 King, supra note 31.
112Id.
113 For a thorough and illuminating discussion of the obstacles facing welfare
mothers, see Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26
CONN. L. REv. 817 (1994); Lucie E. White, On the "Consensus" to End Welfare:
Where Are the Women's Voices?, 26 CONN. L. REv. 843 (1994).
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parent families in the general population. 114 In New Jersey, for example, the
average number of children in a welfare family is 1.9 while the average for
nonwelfare families is 2.0.115 Nationally, the average number of children in a
welfare family has decreased over the last two decades from 3.0 to 1.9
presently.' 16 Less than ten percent of all welfare families have more than three
children. 117 Furthermore, a welfare mother's likelihood of giving birth
decreases the longer she remains on welfare. 118 Most welfare mothers,
however, do not participate in the system for more than two years; most
people's reliance on the system is transitional.' 19 Often women who become
single mothers by divorce need welfare support as they adjust to the burdens of
playing a dual parental role and of finding work and sufficient child care. 120
These facts do not deny that twenty-five percent of the welfare mothers are
long-term recipients;12' they merely put the overblown stereotype into a
realistic perspective.
Thus, the very premise upon which Family Cap is based is flawed. The
primary problems it seeks to remedy have been distorted. Moreover, the
program contradicts the stated purposes of AFDC: to assure the care and
protection of needy dependent children and to assist parents in becoming self-
supporting consistent with maintaining family life. 122 The denial of benefits
penalizes the needy children. The newborn children who are ineligible for aid
are not the only ones affected; all of the children in the family suffer from the
reduction in the family's per capita income. In New Jersey, recent figures show
that over 240,000 children receive AFDC benefits. 123 Furthermore, Family
114 See Williams, supra note 3, at 737-38.
115 Richmond, supra note 11 (citing the New Jersey Department of Human Services as
its source).
116 See Press Release, supra note 30, at 4; Jason DeParle, Why Marginal Changes
Don't Rescue the Welfare System, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 1, 1992, § 4, at 3; see also Williams,
supra note 3, at 738.
117 See DeParle, supra note 116; Williams, supra note 3, at 738.
118 See Williams, supra note 3, at 738 n.116.
119 Lacayo, supra note 108, at 25; see also DeParle, supra note 116.
120 E LLWOOD, supra note 29, at 148.
121 Id. Ellwood does note that this significant minority of welfare mothers uses almost
two-thirds of the AFDC funds distributed each year. See also DeParle, supra note 116.122 See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988). It has been established through case law that the
"paramount goal" of the AFDC program is to protect dependent children. See Gardenia v.
Norton, 425 F. Supp. 922 (D. Conn. 1976); Doe v. Hursh, 337 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn.
1970); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969); Woods v. Woods, 133 Cal.
App. 3d 954 (1982); Evans v. Department of Social Servs., 178 N.W.2d 173 (Mich. 1970).




Cap does nothing to help welfare mothers become self-supporting. Pregnant
women and women with newborn infants are often unable to work outside the
home due to obvious health and childcare constraints. Withholding necessary
funds simply plunges the entire family further into poverty and dependency.
The symbolic effect of the Family Cap program cannot be ignored. The
program effectively tells women that they do not deserve to have a family
because they are poor. Encouraging recipients to become self-supporting and
independent involves not only the "mutual responsibility" touted by Family
Cap's proponents, but mutual respect. This program shows little respect for the
welfare mothers' ability to make choices and to care for their families. The
welfare system as a whole has been criticized for its demeaning stigma; the
bureaucratic difficulties of being a recipient are often enough to undermine
one's self esteem. 124 Family Cap imposes the previously described inaccurate
and negative stereotypes of welfare mothers on the seventy-five percent of the
recipients' 25 who do not deserve it.
B. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Inaccessibility of Abortion for
Poor Women
In the unfortunate event that a welfare mother has an unplanned
pregnancy, 126 her options are exceedingly limited. As a result of the Hyde
Amendment' 27 and the subsequent case declaring it constitutional, 128 states
may put restrictions on Medicaid funding available for abortions. Thus, many
poor women cannot afford to terminate their pregnancies. This mixed set of
societal messages further stigmatizes welfare mothers. First, they are disdained
for their poverty. Next, they are effectively told they are not worthy of having
children. Finally, they face society's moral judgments about abortion in the
form of its limited availability.
Each of the states which has enacted Family Cap has an anti-abortion-
funding statute or regulation. New Jersey will not fund an abortion unless it is
124 See ELLWOOD, supra note 29, at 141 (describing the bureaucratic nightmare
involved in receiving welfare benefits).
125 Id. at 148.
126 Over half of all pregnancies in the United States each year, 3.4 million, are
unintended. Forty-three percent of these unintended pregnancies, 1.4 million, result from
the failure of contraceptives. RACHEL B. GOLD, ABORTIONS AND WOMEN'S HEALTH: A
TURNING POINT FOR AMERICA? 11 (1990).
127 Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979). See
supra note 83 for an explanation of the Hyde Amendment.
128 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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medically necessary to save the life of the mother. 129 Wisconsin's statute
restricts funding to medically necessary cases and those which are the result of
a rape or incest as verified by a doctor. 130 Ironically, in light of the Wisconsin
Family Cap's focus on teen mothers, the state also prohibits the use of public
funds for purchasing or dispensing contraceptives in adolescent health clinics
located in schools, providing abortions to adolescents, and advertising abortion
services as part of a state media effort to prevent teen pregnancy. 131 Arkansas
has a constitutional amendment prohibiting the use of public funds to pay for
any abortion "except to save the mother's life." 132 Georgia's rule against
funding abortions was promulgated by its Department of Medical Assistance
and was judicially declared to include all abortions which are medically
necessary and the minimum medical services involved in those procedures. 133
These restrictions on public funding for abortions have a significantly
negative impact on poor women. Nearly two-thirds of the women who have
abortions chose that option because they cannot afford to have a child. 134 Yet,
due to the funding restrictions, this option is often inaccessible. As a result,
twenty to twenty-five percent of Medicaid-eligible women seeking abortions
carry their unwanted pregnancies to term.135 Many poor women forgo basic
necessities such as food and clothing in order to raise the money for an
abortion.' 36 Out of desperation, some women take serious health risks by either
resorting to illegal or self-induced abortions 137 or delaying the abortion until
after nine weeks of pregnancy. 138 The threat of the Family Cap denial of
benefits will surely act as a factor for women who feel they cannot afford to
129 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981).
130 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 20.927 (West 1986).
131 WiS. STAT. ANN. § 46.93(4) (West 1987).
132 ARK. CONST. of 1874, amend. 68, § 1 (1994). The amendment was proposed by
initiative petition and adopted at the 1988 general election.
133 Doe v. Busbee, 481 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
134 GOLD, supra note 126, at 19.
135 Id. at 51.
13 6 Id. at 52.
137 Approximately five percent of Medicaid-eligible women resort to these dangerous
measures. Carole A. Corns, Comment, The Impact of Public Aborion Funding Decisions
on Indigent Women: A Proposal to Reform State Statutory and Constitutional Abortion
Funding Provisions, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 371, 396 (1991).
138 GOLD, supra note 126, at 52. Due to the restrictions on funding, nearly 50% of
Medicaid-eligible patients have their abortions after the ninth week of pregnancy. After the
eighth week of pregnancy the risk of death or serious illness increases greatly. An abortion
performed at eleven weeks is three times more dangerous than one performed at eight
weeks. Id. at 29.
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have a child. Unfortunately, these women often also cannot afford an abortion
and will sadly have to resort to one of these options.
Ultimately, an unplanned pregnancy can spell disaster for a welfare
mother. The laws on either end of her predicament cut her off; the state will
not help her support the new child nor will it help her terminate the pregnancy
and yet it expects her to become self-supporting and independent. The irony is
that, in the end, the state will still pay for the child in the form of health,
education, and crime problems commonly associated with poverty. 139
C. Remembering the Children
A final, but far from anecdotal, issue concerns who really pays the price
for this reform effort. The children do. Regardless of the infringement of their
mothers' constitutional rights, the children bear the burden of the Family Cap
condition. The newborn children and the other children in AFDC recipient
families are two of the parties represented in the New Jersey class action suit
mentioned earlier. 14° These families can barely clothe and feed their children
on the pre-Family Cap benefits they receive. The denial of additional funds
often means the family will become homeless because there is not enough
money to pay rent.141 These results are exactly what AFDC is designed to
prevent. In reality, Family Cap limits the effectiveness of AFDC.
Welfare reform often acts at the expense of the children it affects. As one
social scientist explains:
[Children] are the silent partners whose voices are seldom heard and whose
needs are seldom considered in the moral debate about welfare.... At best,
139 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 28, at 201-09. Another alternative which
may be suggested is adoption. However, reality steps in once again. Many welfare mothers
are minorities. In 1988, 45% of welfare recipients in the United States were nonwhite. In
some states, however, like New Jersey, welfare recipients are predominantly from minority
backgrounds. See Letter from Alan Jenkins, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., Nina Perales, Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Martha Davis,
NOW Legal Defense and Educational Fund, to Louis Sullivan, Secretary of U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services 10 nn.20 & 21 and accompanying text (June 26,
1992) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). Minority children are adopted less often
than white children. In fact, until recently, many adoption agencies excluded people of color
from the adoption process. See Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of
Color, and Low-Income Women, in REPRODUCrIvE LAwS FOR THE 1990S 52 (Sherrill Cohen
and Nadine Taub eds., 1989). If no one adopts the children, they become costly wards of
the state.
140 Press Release, supra note 30, at 2.
141 Id. at 1.
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they are viewed as an impediment to setting the poor to work.... At worst
they are viewed as the result of the moral depravity of the poor. The impact of
welfare... on the well-being of children is generally ignored. 142
Family Cap is a perfect example of how a cost-benefit analysis tends to ignore
the needs of children. Any government program which so directly affects
children's needs must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.
For this reason alone, Family Cap fails the test.
V. CONCLUSION
The Family Cap program compromises the integrity of our legal system
and the constitutional rights it is designed to protect. This Comment has
attempted to show how welfare mothers' fundamental rights are being
sacrificed in the name of reform. According to the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the government is barred from indirectly violating any right which
it cannot violate directly. The right to bear a child is such a right. As discussed
in this Comment, a strict application of the doctrine is not dispositive due to its
inconsistent precedents. Yet, the doctrine is helpful in determining the
appropriate level of judicial review, strict scrutiny.
Applying the strictest standard of review reveals the inconsistencies and
poorly conceived nature of the Family Cap program. It is based on inaccurate
stereotypes of welfare mothers, runs contrary to state abortion policies, and
hurts needy children who should be benefited, not burdened, by AFDC. The
denial of benefits deprives the families of basic necessities like food, clothing,
and housing. The choice between having a child and being able to provide
these necessities is no choice at all for a single welfare mother who becomes
pregnant. In the end, Family Cap is no more than a punitive measure imposed
by society on its least favored citizens.
Ultimately, whether or not a court finds that Family Cap violates the
fundamental right to bear a child, the program fails as an unsound public
policy. For this reason, not only should states reconsider its use, but the federal
government should abandon any plans to enact it on a national level. The
Republican's "Contract with America" supports Family Cap programs 143 and
President Clinton, who previously said he would not sign a Family Cap bill, 144
now openly endorses these reforms.
The American welfare system is in need of drastic reform; this fact is
undeniable. As the bureaucracy grows and the number of available jobs
142 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 28, at 199.
143 Eliza N. Carney, Test Drive, 26 NAT'L J. 2893 (1994).
144 King, supra note 32.
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shrinks, the system is unable to achieve its purpose, to help recipients become
self-supporting. However, the failures of the present system cannot be
summarily blamed on the recipients. Their rights are not the price society can
afford to pay in order to fix the problem.

